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Abstract. Many epistemologists have endorsed a version of the view that rational belief is sensitive to 
higher-order defeat. That is to say, even a fully rational belief state can be defeated by (sufficiently strong) 
misleading higher-order evidence, which indicates that the belief state is irrational. In a recent paper, 
however, Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2014) calls this view into doubt. Her argument proceeds in two stages. 
First, she argues that higher-order defeat calls for a two-tiered theory of epistemic rationality. Secondly, 
she argues that there seems to be no satisfactory way of avoiding epistemic dilemmas within a two-tiered 
framework. Hence, she concludes that the prospects look dim for making sense of higher-order defeat 
within a broader theoretical picture of epistemic rationality. Here I aim to resist both parts of Lasonen-
Aarnio’s challenge. First, I outline a way of accommodating higher-order defeat within a single-tiered 
framework, by amending epistemic rules with appropriate provisos for different kinds of higher-order 
defeat. Secondly, I argue that those who nevertheless prefer to accommodate higher-order defeat within a 
two-tiered framework can do so without admitting to the possibility of epistemic dilemmas, since 
epistemic rules are not always accompanied by ‘oughts’ in a two-tiered framework. The considerations 
put forth thus indirectly vindicate the view that rational belief is sensitive to higher-order defeat. 
1. Introduction 
Many epistemologists have endorsed a version of the view that rational belief is sensitive to 
higher-order defeat. That is to say, even a fully rational belief state can be defeated by 
(sufficiently strong) misleading higher-order evidence, which indicates that the belief state 
is irrational. Here is a putative example:1 
Self-Enhancement Bias: John rationally believes that he is better than most people at 
driving. However, when reading today’s newspaper, John learns about the well-
documented self-enhancement bias: the widespread tendency to overrate oneself on a 
wide range of qualities and abilities, including intelligence, driving skills, and so on. As 
it happens, John is one of the few people who does not suffer from the bias. 
                                                          
1 Similar cases of misleading higher-order evidence can be found in, e.g., Christensen (2010; forthcoming), 
Dorst (forthcoming a,b), Horowitz (2014), Skipper (forthcoming a,b), Whiting (2017; forthcoming), and 
Worsnip (2018; forthcoming). 
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Upon learning about the self-enhancement bias, how, if at all, should John revise his opinion 
about his own driving skills? In order to avoid getting sidetracked by issues concerning the 
(un)reliability of current journalism and experimental psychology, let us simply assume that 
John, after having read the newspaper, has good reason to think that the self-enhancement 
bias is indeed a widespread and pervasive phenomenon. Given this, it seems plausible to say 
that John should give up his belief (or at least become less confident) that he is better than 
most people at driving. After all, he has strong—albeit misleading—reason to think that his 
belief is the result of an irrational bias, and it seems plausible to say that one should give up 
beliefs that one has strong reason to think are irrational. 
In recent years, a number of attempts have been made at vindicating the intuition that 
agents like John should revise their opinions, even if the higher-order evidence at hand is 
misleading. Perhaps the most prominent suggestion is due to David Christensen (2007; 2010; 
2011; forthcoming), who points out that someone who disregards a body of misleading 
higher-order evidence seems to fall prey to an objectionable kind of dogmatism or question-
begging reasoning: if John does not revise his opinion in response to the evidence about the 
self-enhancement bias, he must, it seems, take the evidence to be misleading. But the 
evidence is obviously only misleading if John does not suffer from the self-enhancement bias. 
So if John does not revise his opinion in response to the evidence about the self-enhancement 
bias, he must treat himself as an exception to the rule. However, the thought goes, John 
thereby seems to beg the question the against the studies on the self-enhancement bias. 
Contraposing: since John shouldn’t engage in this kind of question-begging reasoning, he 
should revise his opinion about his own driving skills in reponse to the evidence about the 
self-enhancement bias.2 
Despite the intuitive pull of this diagnosis, Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2014) has recently 
challenged the view that rational belief is sensitive to higher-order defeat. Her argument 
proceeds in two stages. First, she argues that higher-order defeat calls for a two-tiered theory 
of epistemic rationality. Secondly, she argues that there seems to be no satisfactory way of 
avoiding epistemic dilemmas within a two-tiered framework. Hence, she concludes that the 
                                                          
2 For other considerations in favor of the view that rational belief is sensitive to higher-order defeat, see also 
Schoenfield (2016) and Elga (2007). In effect, Elga argues that peer disagreement must act as a higher-order 
defeater, since one could otherwise become justified in considering an epistemic peer to be an epistemic inferior 
merely by discovering that he or she disagrees with oneself. While many have found Elga’s view basically correct, 
those who don’t typically still accept that peer disagreement can have defeating force—see, e.g., Kelly (2010) 
and Lackey (2008). To my knowledge, Titelbaum (2015) is the only current proponent of the view that 
disagreement can never have defeating force. 
3 
 
prospects look dim for making sense of higher-order defeat within a broader theoretical 
picture of epistemic rationality. If she is right, we are faced with the counterintuitive result 
that John should not revise his opinion about his own driving skills upon learning about the 
self-enhancement bias (and, more generally, that that a rational belief can remain rational 
even in light of strong evidence to the contrary). 
Here I aim to resist both parts of Lasonen-Aarnio’s challenge. After laying out Lasonen-
Aarnio’s argument in more detail (§2), I outline a way of accommodating higher-order 
defeat within a single-tiered framework, by amending epistemic rules with appropriate 
provisos for different types of higher-order defeat (§3). I then argue that those who 
nevertheless prefer to accommodate higher-order defeat within a two-tiered framework can 
do so without admitting to the possibility of epistemic dilemmas, since epistemic rules are 
not always accompanied by ‘oughts’ in a two-tiered framework (§4). The considerations put 
forth thus indirectly vindicate the view that rational belief is sensitive to higher-order defeat. 
2. Lasonen-Aarnio on Higher-Order Defeat 
Lasonen-Aarnio frames her discussion within a rule-based picture of epistemic rationality on 
which rational epistemic agents are characterized by following correct epistemic rules. We 
can think of epistemic rules as abstract functions from epistemic situations to sets of 
rationally permitted belief states. For example, one epistemic rule might enjoin me to believe 
that p whenever I have reliable testimony that p, whereas another epistemic rule might enjoin 
me to believe that p whenever it looks to me as if p. Needless to say, this picture gives rise to 
a number of tricky questions: how are epistemic rules to be formulated? What does it take for 
an epistemic rule to be ‘correct’? What does it mean to ‘follow’ an epistemic rule in the 
relevant sense? I shall largely dodge such foundational issues in what follows.3 For present 
purposes, we can simply grant that a broadly rule-based framework provides a fruitful way of 
thinking about epistemic rationality. 
In line with Lasonen-Aarnio, let us say that a rule-based theory of epistemic rationality 
is ‘single-tiered’ given that following correct epistemic rules is both necessary and sufficient 
for epistemic rationality: 
Single-Tiered Framework: An agent’s belief state S is epistemically rational if and only 
if S is the result of following correct epistemic rules. 
                                                          
3 See Boghossian (2008) for an illuminating discussion of various foundational issues concerning epistemic 
rule-following. 
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Suppose we aim to accommodate higher-order defeat within such a single-tiered framework. 
We must then ensure that whenever an agent in a rational belief state S receives sufficiently 
strong evidence that S is irrational, S is defeated by that evidence. That is, as Lasonen-Aarnio 
(2014, pp. 321-22) observes, epistemic rules must satisfy the following condition in order to 
be correct: 
Rule Condition: If an agent has sufficiently strong overall evidence that her belief state S 
is not the result of following correct epistemic rules, then S is not the result of following 
correct epistemic rules. 
This condition ensures that whenever an agent in a rational belief state receives a higher-
order defeater, the belief state is no longer rational for the agent. Hence, by requiring that 
epistemic rules must satisfy the Rule Condition to be correct, we have a systematic way of 
making sense of higher-order defeat within a single-tiered framework. 
However, according to Lasonen-Aarnio (pp. 322-24), we shouldn’t expect that every 
correct epistemic rule satisfies the Rule Condition. Consider, for instance, a rule that enjoins 
me to believe that q if I believe that p & (p → q). This rule doesn’t satisfy the Rule Condition: 
it’s perfectly possible for my belief state to be the result of correctly applying modus ponens, 
even if I have strong reason to think that modus ponens is invalid or that I’m unable to apply 
modus ponens correctly. Yet, Lasonen-Aarnio submits, this shouldn’t lead us to conclude 
that modus ponens is incorrect. Rather, we should maintain that modus ponens is correct, 
but that one can get misleading evidence to the contrary. Later, in §3, I will suggest that we 
might reasonably hold that modus ponens is an incorrect epistemic rule in virtue of violating 
the Rule Condition, but maintain that there is nonetheless something importantly right about 
modus ponens, which isn’t diminished by the possibility of acquiring misleading evidence to 
the contrary. For now, however, let us proceed on the assumption that epistemic rules need 
not satisfy the Rule Condition to be correct. This means that we must look beyond a single-
tiered framework to make sense of higher-order defeat. 
According to two-tiered theories, as Lasonen-Aarnio understands them, following 
correct epistemic rules is necessary, but not sufficient, for epistemic rationality: 
Two-Tiered Framework: An agent’s belief state S is epistemically rational if and only if: 
(i) S is the result of following correct epistemic rules; and 
(ii) The agent does not have strong overall evidence that S is not the result of following 
correct epistemic rules. 
If we adopt a two-tiered version of the rule-based framework, we can say that a belief state S 
is irrational despite resulting from following correct epistemic rules. For example, my belief 
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state might be the result of following modus ponens, yet be irrational because I have strong 
reasons to think that modus ponens is invalid or that I’m unable to correctly apply modus 
ponens. And John’s belief that he is better than average at driving might be the result of 
following correct inductive rules, yet be irrational because he has strong reasons to think that 
his belief is the result of an irrational bias. As such, two-tiered theories give us the resources 
to make sense of higher-order defeat without assuming that epistemic rules must satisfy the 
Rule Condition to be correct. 
But according to Lasonen-Aarnio (2014, pp. 328-30), two-tiered theories have a serious 
drawback, namely that they generate epistemic dilemmas: situations where an agent ought to 
adopt incompatible doxastic attitudes (for instance, believing and suspending judgment 
about the same proposition). Her reasoning goes as follows: let R be a correct epistemic rule, 
which enjoins me to believe that p in my current epistemic situation. Assuming that R violates 
the Rule Condition, it must be possible for me to receive a higher-order defeater in light of 
which I should give up my belief in p, although R still enjoins me to believe that p. Hence, 
there must exist another correct epistemic rule R', which enjoins me to suspend judgment 
about p upon having received the higher-order defeater. As a result, the rules R and R' end up 
giving me conflicting recommendations: R enjoins me to believe that p, whereas R' enjoins 
me to suspend judgment about p. This leads Lasonen-Aarnio to conclude that “[i]f correct 
rules are accompanied by oughts, it looks like [I] ought to believe that p, and [I] ought to 
suspend judgment in p” (Lasonen-Aarnio 2014, p. 329). In other words, it looks like I face an 
epistemic dilemma.4 
These are the bare bones of Lasonen-Aarnio’s two-piece challenge to the proponent of 
higher-order defeat: (i) higher-order defeat seems to call out for a two-tiered theory of 
epistemic rationality, and (ii) two-tiered theories seem to generate epistemic dilemmas. In 
her subsequent discussion of this challenge, Lasonen-Aarnio considers and rejects various 
strategies for meeting the challenge, either by embracing the possibility of epistemic 
dilemmas, or by trying to specify a version of the rule-based framework (either single-tiered 
or two-tiered) that doesn’t generate epistemic dilemmas after all. I will return to this part of 
Lasonen-Aarnio’s discussion in due course, but for now it suffices to have the basic challenge 
on the table. 
                                                          
4 Lasonen-Aarnio (2014, pp. 329-30) also argues that cases of conflicting recommendations by correct epistemic 
rules can arise even if epistemic rules are formulated in terms of what one is permitted to believe, rather than in 
terms of what one is required to believe. But for present purposes, we can simply grant that epistemic rules 
specify what is required rather than what is permitted. 
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3. Higher-Order Defeat in a Single-Tiered Framework 
This section concerns the first part of Lasonen-Aarnio’s challenge. I want to defend two 
claims, a negative and a positive. Negatively, I will argue that Lasonen-Aarnio’s case against 
the Rule Condition is ill-founded. Positively, I will use the Rule Condition to outline and 
motivate a way of accommodating higher-order defeat within a single-tiered framework. 
First, the negative point. Recall that Lasonen-Aarnio’s case against the Rule Condition 
was based on the observation that there are seemingly correct epistemic rules, such as modus 
ponens, that nevertheless fail to satisfy the Rule Condition. I think there is something right 
and something wrong about this observation, which can be brought out by distinguishing 
two different conceptions of what it means for an epistemic rule to be ‘correct’. On one 
understanding, an epistemic rule is correct to the extent that it is truth-conducive or truth-
preserving, where truth-conduciveness is a matter of generating true beliefs, and truth-
preservation is a matter of preserving true beliefs.5 On this understanding, modus ponens is 
clearly correct in virtue of being deductively valid. But various non-deductive (e.g. inductive 
and abductive) rules are presumably also correct in this sense, despite falling short of perfect 
truth-preservation. On another understanding, an epistemic rule is correct to the extent that 
it is rational for agents to follow it across all—or at least a sufficiently wide range of—
epistemic situations. On this understanding, it is much less clear that modus ponens is 
correct, precisely because one can have strong reason think that modus ponens is invalid or 
that one is unable to apply modus ponens correctly. Hence, whether modus ponens is a 
correct epistemic rule may well depend on the notion of correctness we have in mind. 
In the present context, since we are considering what it’s rational for agents to believe in 
different epistemic situations, we presumably want to interpret the Rule Condition as a 
condition on what it takes for an epistemic rule to be correct in the latter sense. Accordingly, 
when we say that modus ponens is incorrect in virtue of violating the Rule Condition, we are 
not saying that modus ponens is anything less than perfectly truth-preserving. Rather, we are 
saying that it isn’t always rational to follow modus ponens, since one can have strong reason 
to think that modus ponens is invalid or that one is unable to apply modus ponens correctly. 
And this doesn’t strike me as an implausible thing to say, especially if we consider logical 
rules of a more complex nature than modus ponens. 
Someone might worry that we end up with a circular account of epistemic rationality, if 
we spell out what it means for an epistemic rule to be correct in terms of whether it is rational 
to follow the rule across a sufficiently wide range of circumstances. But there seems to be a 
natural way of avoiding such circularity by holding that it’s rational for an agent to follow a 
                                                          
5 This distinction is equivalent (or at least very similar in spirit) to Goldman’s (1979) distinction between 
‘conditional’ and ‘unconditional’ reliability. 
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given epistemic rule provided that the agent has (sufficiently strong) overall reason to think 
that doing so is (sufficiently) conducive to the formation of true beliefs. This allows us to 
avoid circularity while being faithful to the initial motivation for saying that it can be 
irrational for an agent to follow an epistemic rule, even if the rule is in fact perfectly truth-
conducive or truth-preserving. 
Another potential worry about the distinction between a rule’s being truth-conducive 
(or truth-preserving) and its being rational to follow is that it obscures the connection 
between rationality and truth. If rational belief is supposed to aim at truth, how could it be 
irrational to follow a rule that is perfectly truth-conducive or truth-preserving? I think we 
can answer this worry by drawing an analogy between propositions and rules. Just as it can 
be irrational to believe a true proposition (if one has strong reason to think that the 
proposition is false), so it can be irrational to follow a truth-conducive or truth-preserving 
rule (if one has strong reason to think that following the rule isn’t conducive to the formation 
of true beliefs). And just as we can nevertheless aim to believe only what is true, we can 
nevertheless aim to follow only rules that are truth-conducive or truth-preserving. As such, 
the distinction between a rule’s being truth-conducive (or truth-preserving) and its being 
rational to follow seems compatible with there being an important normative connection 
between the two. Obviously, the connection will be less direct than saying that a rule is 
rational to follow if and only if it is truth-conducive (or truth-preserving). But this seems no 
less plausible than denying that a proposition is rational to believe if and only if it is true. 
Hence, the claim that epistemic rules must satisfy the Rule Condition to be correct (in the 
relevant sense of ‘correct’) strikes me as quite plausible, or at least not as implausible as 
Lasonen-Aarnio seems to think. 
Next, the positive point. Even if the above considerations are basically correct, it remains 
to be seen whether there is a satisfactory way of ensuring that correct epistemic rules satisfy 
the Rule Condition. In passing Lasonen-Aarnio considers the possibility of amending 
epistemic rules with provisos for different higher-order defeaters. However, she takes it to be 
“at least a prima facie challenge” to show how an epistemic rule could have provisos “for all 
possible higher-order defeaters built into it” (Lasonen-Aarnio 2014, p. 324). Here I want to 
suggest a way of meeting this challenge. As a first step, consider the following qualification of 
modus ponens: 
Modus Ponens (provisional): Follow modus ponens, unless: 
(i) Some correct epistemic rule enjoins you to believe that modus ponens is incorrect; 
or 
(ii) Some correct epistemic rule enjoins you to believe that you are likely to misapply 
modus ponens. 
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This rule features two provisos, which correspond to the two central types of higher-order 
defeat discussed by Lasonen-Aarnio: (i) higher-order defeat due to evidence that a given 
epistemic rule is incorrect, and (ii) higher-order defeat due to evidence that one is incapable 
of applying an epistemic rule correctly. Perhaps some higher-order defeaters do not fall neatly 
within these two categories. If so, we might have to amend modus ponens with additional 
provisos. But the provisos included here cover at least the most commonly discussed cases of 
higher-order defeat in the recent literature. 
If all correct epistemic rules come with provisos akin to those in Modus Ponens 
(provisional), we have the resources to accommodate higher-order defeat within a single-
tiered framework. Consider a structurally similar case to Self-Enhancement Bias, adapted 
from Christensen (2016, p. 401): 
Modus Ponens on Drugs: Suzy rationally believes that p & (p → q), and she forms a 
belief in q as a result of correctly applying modus ponens. But she is now told from a 
reliable source that she has been given a reason-distorting drug that subtly, but 
significantly, impairs her ability to perform even simple deductive inferences. As a 
matter of fact, Suzy has not been drugged. 
Assuming that this is a case of higher-order defeat, Suzy is rationally permitted to believe that 
q before being told that she has been drugged, but she isn’t rationally permitted to believe that 
q after being so told. And the proposed single-tiered account yields precisely this result, since 
the second proviso in Modus Ponens (provisional) is met after, but not before, Suzy is told 
about the drug. (The same would obviously hold if Suzy’s higher-order defeater had instead 
consisted of evidence indicating that modus ponens is invalid.) 
However, while epistemic rules like Modus Ponens (provisional) allow us to make sense 
of ordinary cases of higher-order defeat—like Modus Ponens on Drugs and Self-
Enhancement Bias—they do not allow us to make sense of all possible cases of higher-order 
defeat. For as Lasonen-Aarnio (2014, p. 323) points out, Suzy could in principle get strong 
reason to think that Modus Ponens (provisional) is incorrect or that she is unable to apply it 
correctly. Hence, if we want to accommodate such non-standard cases of higher-order defeat, 
we need to amend modus ponens with a second layer of provisos: 
Modus Ponens (doubly provisional): Follow Modus Ponens (provisional), unless: 
(i) Some correct epistemic rule enjoins you to believe that Modus Ponens (provisional) 
is incorrect; or 
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(ii) Some correct epistemic rule enjoins you to believe that you are likely to misapply 
Modus Ponens (provisional). 
Continuing this path, we run into an infinite regress: a third layer of provisos is needed to 
accommodate a case where Suzy gets strong reason to think that Modus Ponens (doubly 
provisional) is incorrect or that she is unable to apply it correctly, and so on. Thus, if we want 
to accommodate all possible cases of higher-order defeat, it looks like correct epistemic rules 
must feature infinite layers of provisos for different kinds of higher-order defeat. 
What should we make of the resulting view? By way of comparison, consider a different 
single-tiered view, which Lasonen-Aarnio (2014, §4) discusses under the label ‘The Über-
Rule View’. On this view, a belief state is epistemically rational if and only if it is the result of 
following an overarching epistemic rule—the Über-rule—which determines, for any given 
epistemic situation, which belief states are rationally permitted in that situation. Accordingly, 
higher-order defeat is to be made sense of by reverse-engineering the content of the Über-
rule in such a way that it delivers the desired verdicts in cases like Self-Enhancement Bias.  
While Lasonen-Aarnio raises a number of different worries about The Über-Rule View, 
perhaps the most serious problem is that an extensionally adequate Über-rule must 
presumably be a highly complex construct of gerrymandering, which can hardly be expressed 
in “any finite, informative way” (Lasonen-Aarnio 2014, p. 332). Consequently, the worry 
goes, the Über-rule can hardly offer the kind of epistemic guidance that we should expect 
correct epistemic rules to be able to offer (Lasonen-Aarnio 2014, p. 333). 
Let us straightaway grant this criticism of the Über-rule view. Does the single-tiered view 
outlined above fall prey to a similar criticism? It seems not. Despite the addition of infinite 
layers of provisos, the view is nevertheless able to offer genuine guidance. Consider Modus 
Ponens on Drugs: we previously saw that Suzy’s initial belief that q is deemed rational, since 
none of the provisos in Modus Ponens (provisional) are initially met. But when Suzy receives 
the higher-order defeater, she may no longer believe that q, because the second proviso in 
Modus Ponens (provisional) is now met. Hence, it looks like Suzy has all the guidance she 
needs to decide which doxastic attitude she should adopt towards q before and after receiving 
the higher-order defeater. And the same obviously goes for other ordinary cases of higher-
order defeat such as Self-Enhancement Bias. 
What about non-standard cases of higher-order defeat? Suppose Suzy gets a second 
higher-order defeater, which consists of evidence that Modus Ponens (provisional) is 
incorrect. Here things become a bit more complicated. On the proposed view, Suzy should 
resort to Modus Ponens (doubly provisional), because one of the provisos in Modus Ponens 
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(provisional) is met. But which doxastic attitude does this rule enjoin Suzy to adopt towards 
q? It seems to depend on the exact content of the second higher-order defeater. Suppose the 
second higher-order defeater indicates that Modus Ponens (provisional) is incorrect, without 
indicating why it is incorrect. We can then imagine how Suzy might entertain different 
possible explanains of why Modus Ponens (provisional) is incorrect. One possible 
explanation is that it is always reasonable to follow modus ponens, contrary to what Modus 
Ponens (provisional) says. If so, Suzy is presumably enjoined to believe that q, since this is 
what modus ponens enjoins. But another possible explanation is that Modus Ponens 
(provisional) is incorrect in virtue of failing to take into account every type of situation in 
which it is unreasonable to follow modus ponens. If so, Suzy is presumably enjoined to 
suspend judgment about q, since her current situation still counts as one in which it is 
unreasonable to follow modus ponens. Thus, it looks like Suzy faces a problem of 
underdetermination about which doxastic attitude she is enjoined to adopt towards q. 
Is this sort of underdetermination a vice or a virtue of the proposed view? Someone who 
thinks that there must always be a determinate answer to questions about which doxastic 
attitudes we should adopt towards different propositions might want to conclude that the 
proposed single-tiered theory fails to offer enough guidance in situations like Suzy’s. 
However, it isn’t clear to me that there is a determinate answer to the question of which 
doxastic attitude Suzy should adopt towards q. Suzy’s situation might just be a genuine case 
of underdetermination concerning which doxastic attitude she should adopt. If so, we should 
consider the underdetermination property of the proposed view as a feature, not a bug.  
In any case, regardless of how we settle the issue about underdetermination, the 
proposed view at least seems well placed to offer genuine guidance in ordinary cases of 
higher-order defeat like Modus Ponens on Drugs and Self-Enhancement Bias. As such, I see 
no reason to be pessimistic about the prospects for accommodating higher-order defeat 
within a single-tiered framework. 
4. Higher-Order Defeat in a Two-Tiered Framework 
This section concerns the second part of Lasonen-Aarnio’s challenge. My aim is to argue that 
even if the single-tiered view outlined in the previous section cannot be made to work, we can 
still make sense of higher-order defeat within a two-tiered framework without committing 
ourselves to the possibility of epistemic dilemmas. 
Recall Lasonen-Aarnio’s basic reasons for thinking that two-tiered theories tend to 
generate epistemic dilemmas: (i) correct epistemic rules can give conflicting 
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recommendations in a two-tiered framework, and (ii) correct epistemic rules are 
“accompanied by oughts” (Lasonen-Aarnio 2014, p. 329). My strategy will be to grant the 
former claim, but deny the latter: correct epistemic rules may well deliver conflicting 
recommendations in a two-tiered framework, but we should not expect such conflicting 
recommendations to constitute genuine epistemic dilemmas. 
Let us begin with a simple observation: epistemic rules play a very different role in a two-
tiered framework than in a single-tiered framework. Suppose a rule R enjoins an agent to 
believe that p in a given situation. On a single-tiered view, R’s recommendation will 
invariably constitute a rational requirement on part of the agent to believe that p, since single-
tiered theories work with a straightforward ‘one-to-one’ correspondence between 
requirements of rationality and recommendations of correct epistemic rules. Accordingly, 
conflicting recommendations by correct epistemic rules always generate epistemic dilemmas 
within a single-tiered framework. By contrast, in a two-tiered framework, R’s 
recommendation need not constitute a rational requirement to believe that p, since two-
tiered theories do not feature a one-to-one correspondence between requirements of 
rationality and recommendations of correct epistemic rules. Accordingly, conflicting 
recommendations by correct epistemic rules need not generate epistemic dilemmas within a 
two-tiered framework. 
This observation already suffices to mitigate, at least to some degree, the second part of 
Lasonen-Aarnio’s challenge. Suppose I’m enjoined to believe that p by a correct epistemic 
rule R. Assuming, as we do, that R need not satisfy the Rule Condition, it must be possible for 
me to acquire a higher-order defeater in light of which I should give up my belief that p, 
although R still enjoins me to believe that p. Hence, there must exist another correct epistemic 
rule R', which enjoins me to suspend judgment about p upon having received the higher-
order defeater. As a result, the rules R and R' end up giving me conflicting recommendations: 
R enjoins me to believe that p, whereas R' enjoins me to suspend judgment about p. This is 
what led Lasonen-Aarnio to conclude that two-tiered theories tend to generate epistemic 
dilemmas. However, since R and R' make their conflicting recommendations in a situation 
where I have received a higher-order defeater, proponents of the two-tiered view will 
presumably want to say that R’s recommendation no longer constitutes a rational 
requirement to believe that p, in which case I do not face an epistemic dilemma. After all, it 
was the ability to accommodate such cases of higher-order defeat that motivated the move to 
a two-tiered framework to begin with. Hence, we should not expect two-tiered theories to 
generate epistemic dilemmas in cases of higher-order defeat. 
Obviously, this does not yet show that there is a satisfying way of filling in the details of 
a two-tiered theory, which ensures that conflicting recommendations by correct epistemic 
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rules never constitute epistemic dilemmas. In particular, it does not fend off Lasonen-
Aarnio’s criticism of the specific two-tiered view that she calls ‘The Hierarchy View’ 
(Lasonen-Aarnio 2014, §6). On this view, a belief state is epistemically rational if and only if 
it is the result of following a correct epistemic rule, which isn’t overridden by a correct 
epistemic rule higher up the hierarchy. The hierarchy of rules is then determined by a meta-
rule, which assigns an ordering of epistemic rules to each epistemic situation. Hence, given 
the right meta-rule, The Hierarchy View might help avoid epistemic dilemmas in cases of 
higher-order defeat: if R' overrides R, I will be required to suspend judgment about p upon 
having acquired the higher-order defeater, but I will not be required to believe that p. 
However, just as Lasonen-Aarnio deems The Über-Rule View inapt to accommodate 
higher-order defeat within a single-tiered framework, she deems The Hierarchy View inapt 
to accommodate higher-order defeat within a two-tiered framework. Here the main worry 
concerns what happens if one gets strong reason to think that the meta-rule is incorrect or 
that one is unable to apply it correctly. According to Lasonen-Aarnio, if we want to 
accommodate such cases of higher-order defeat, we must introduce a set of meta-rules 
together with a ‘meta-meta-rule’, which gives us a ranking of the meta-rules, for each 
epistemic situation. But this strategy quickly leads to an infinite regress due to the further 
possibility of acquiring reasons to think that the meta-meta-rule is incorrect or that one is 
unable to apply it correctly. Hence, according to Lasonen-Aarnio, we face the same worry 
that led us to reject The Über-Rule View: if The Hierarchy View must feature infinitely many 
orders of meta-rules, it becomes unclear how the view can offer genuine guidance (Lasonen-
Aarnio 2014, pp. 340-41). 
This guidance-worry seems to have less force against The Hierarchy View than against 
The Über-Rule View. Of course, there is a sense in which neither view is “finitely expressible,” 
but The Hierarchy View nevertheless seems informative in a way that The Über-Rule View 
is not. In fact, The Hierarchy View seems informative in much the same way as the single-
tiered view proposed in the previous section. Consider Modus Ponens on Drugs: on The 
Hierarchy View, Suzy’s belief that q is initially rational, since it is the result of following a 
correct epistemic rule, call it R, which is not overriden by any other correct epistemic rule. 
But when receiving the higher-order defeater, Suzy is no longer rationally permitted to 
believe that q, since R’s recommendation is now overriden by another rule, call it R', which 
recommends her to suspend judgment about p. Hence, it looks like Suzy has all the guidance 
she needs to determine which doxastic attitude to adopt towards q before and after receiving 
the higher-order defeater. Obviously, The Hierarchy View allows for the possibility that the 
recommendation by R' is itself overridden at some later stage, in which case it might become 
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less clear what The Hierarchy View recommends (for reasons explained in the previous 
section). But at the very least, the Hierarchy seems able to offer genuine guidance in ordinary 
cases of higher-order defeat like Modus Ponens on Drugs and Self-Enhancement Bias. Hence, 
I see no reason to think that the kind of infinity featuring in The Hierarchy View is 
detrimental to the view. But even if it turns out that The Hierarchy View cannot ultimately 
be made to work, it would be premature to conclude that no two-tiered theory can be made 
to work, unless there are general grounds for expecting that two-tiered theories tend to 
generate epistemic dilemmas in cases of higher-order defeat. And I take the foregoing 
considerations to show that such general grounds are lacking. 
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